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Free Exercise of Religion: A New
Translation
I.

Introduction

The First Amendment to the United States Constitution states:
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion,
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof ....
Applying those
words to the complexities of our diverse society has proven to be a
difficult assignment. Justice Robert Jackson explained: "The task of
translating the majestic generalities of the Bill of Rights, conceived
as part of the pattern of liberal government in the eighteenth century, into concrete restraints on officials dealing with the problems of
the twentieth century, is one to disturb self-confidence." 2 This confidence-shaking dilemma has forced a series of line-drawing efforts
throughout American history. In recent years, the Supreme Court
has developed a new translation. 3 Today, the Free Exercise Clause is
much more restrictively interpreted than it has been since the early
1960s.'
Tension exists within the First Amendment itself.' On one hand,
the government is prohibited from establishing religion. On the other
hand, the free exercise of religion cannot be prohibited.' By allowing
the free exercise of religion, the government runs the risk of showing
favoritism towards a certain religion. This may be construed as encouraging the establishment of that religion or sect.' Although the
Establishment Clause is an integral part of First Amendment jurisprudence, this Comment focuses on the Free Exercise Clause.
Most free exercise claims involve requests for exemptions from
*"I

I. U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
2. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943).
3. See, e.g., Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S.
872 (1990), rev'g, 763 P.2d 146 (Or. 1988) (on remand to determine if religious use of peyote
was legal in Oregon), 485 U.S. 660 (1988), vacating and remanding, 301 Or. 209, 721 P.2d
445 (1986) [hereinafter Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990)].
4. "1 couldn't believe what Justice Scalia was saying and that it carried the day. He is
saying basically there is no free exercise clause." Neal Devins, '89-'90 Term Concludes with a
Bang, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 13, 1990, at S2. The Court continues to define the parameters of the
Free Exercise Clause. As this Comment was going to publication, the Court granted certiorari
in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah. See infra note 165.
5.

(1986).
6.
7.

RONALD D. ROTUNDA

ET AL., TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL

See supra note I and accompanying text.
ROTUNDA, supra note 5, at 340-41, § 21.1.

LAW 340-41,

§ 21.1
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laws that interfere with how a group or individual practices religion. 8
The challenged laws are typically constitutional in all other aspects,
but may be unconstitutional in that the laws burden certain religious
practices.9 As one commentator explains: "[T]he jurisprudence of
free exercise, in short is the jurisprudence of the constitutionally
compelled exemption."'" The two major issues addressed in this
Comment are: 1) under what circumstances does the Free Exercise
Clause compel the granting of exemptions from laws; and 2) what
test should be used to determine when such exemptions are
warranted.
Part II of this Comment reviews the historical background of
the Free Exercise Clause from the general intent of the founders
through the free exercise cases of the late 1980s. Part III explains
Employment Division v. Smith1" (hereinafter referred to in text as
Smith H), which drastically changed free exercise interpretation.
Part IV examines the current status of free exercise interpretation by
focusing on cases that have been decided since Smith II. Part V concludes that free exercise rights can best be protected through legislative reform and state constitutions.
II.

Historical Background

A brief history of the Free Exercise Clause provides the required background for an understanding of the present state of the
law. This history is traced from the general intent of the founders
through the Supreme Court cases of the late 1980s.
A.

General Intent of the Founders

The original version of the Constitution did not contain a Bill of
Rights."2 Several states were reluctant to ratify a constitution without assurances that the federal government would respect individual
rights." These states drafted proposed amendments to the original
Constitution at the state ratification conventions." Alexander Hamilton and other Federalists urged that a Bill of Rights was both un8. William P. Marshall, The Case Against the Constitutionally Compelled Free Exercise Exemption, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 357, 357-58 (1989-90).
9. Id.
10. Id. at 358.
II. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
12.
GERARD V. BRADLEY, CHURCH-STATE RELATIONSHIPS IN AMERICA 69 (1987).
13. Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understandingof Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1410, 1480 (1990).

14.

Id.

FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION

necessary and dangerous.1 5 Originally, even James Madison did not
see the need for a Bill of Rights. 6 Largely as a result of political
necessity and compromise, a Bill of Rights was drafted. 17 James

Madison is credited with writing the first draft of the religion sections of the Bill of Rights.' The exact wording of Madison's version
of the religion clauses was changed three times in committee debates' 9 before adoption of what is now part of the First Amendment.
Some historians see the intent of the founders as consistent with
their argument that the Constitution mandates religious exemptions.20 Other commentators argue that the founders never intended
to provide religious exemptions to general laws. 2 ' These commentators are quick to point out that the founders never envisioned applying the Free Exercise Clause to the states. 2 A third view is that
history is at best unclear and should not be used to guide an interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause.2 a
B.

The Belief-Action Distinction

Reynolds v. United States24 is generally recognized as the first
significant Supreme Court case involving the Free Exercise Clause.2 5
George Reynolds, a Utah resident and member of the Church of

Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, was charged with violating a federal law prohibiting polygamy. The Court addressed whether the
Constitution mandated an exception for those who practice polyg15. Federalists thought such a declaration of individual rights was unnecessary because
the federal government did not have powers that were not expressly granted to it. They considered a bill of rights dangerous because the denial of rights which had never been granted
implied that there were powers in the Constitution that were not expressly granted. Philip B.
Kurland, The Origins of the Religion Clauses of the Constitution, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV.
839, 851 (1986).
16. McConnell, supra note 13, at 1477.
17. Kurland, supra note 15, at 850-51.
18. Kurland, supra note 15, at 853.
19. McConnell, supra note 13, at 1481-84.
20. Kurland, supra note 15, at 860; McConnell, supra note 13, at 1516.
21. Marshall, supra note 8, at 375-79.
22. Marshall, supra note 8, at 375.
23. ROTUNDA, supra note 5, at 341-43, § 21.1; see Marshall, supra note 8, at 375-76
(quoting Jesse H. Choper, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment: Reconciling the
Conflict, 41 U. PITT. L. REV. 673, 673 (1980)).
24. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
25. Permoli v. Municipality No. 1, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 588 (1845), a case preceding Reynolds, involved a New Orleans ordinance that prohibited Catholic priests from conducting opencasket funerals unless they were performed at the one city-approved chapel. The city justified
the ordinance on public health grounds. In a short opinion, the Supreme Court held that it
lacked jurisdiction because the ordinance did not violate the Constitution or laws of the United
States. This was ninety-five years before Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (holding that the Free Exercise Clause applied to states via the Fourteenth Amendment).
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amy for religious reasons, such as Reynolds. After analyzing the origins of the Free Exercise Clause and discussing the views of
Madison26 and Jefferson,2 7 the Court concluded that Congress could
not regulate opinion, but could legislate against actions that were
anti-social.2 " The Court found the Free Exercise Clause does not
compel the granting of an exception for behavior prohibited by criminal laws. 9 Reynolds' actions were held to be "'an offence against
society," while monogamous marriage was extolled as a "most important feature of social life.""0 The Court's distinction between belief and action remains an integral part of free exercise jurisprudence. 3 ' The validity and extent of this holding is still being debated
32
today.
C. Free Exercise Coupled with Other Fundamental Rights
In the early 1940s, the Supreme Court decided a series of cases
involving free exercise and free speech rights of Jehovah's Witnesses.33 In Cantwell v. Connecticut,34 the Court held that the free
exercise of religion is a fundamental liberty, and, as such, the Free
Exercise Clause is applicable to. the states via the Fourteenth
Amendment. 5 The Court cited Reynolds36 to explain the belief-action distinction, observing that although the freedom to believe is absolute, the freedom to act cannot be absolute. The Connecticut stat-

ute at issue prohibited solicitation of funds for religious or charitable
26. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 163
27. Id. at 164. The Court quotes Jefferson's famous letter tc the Danbury Baptist Association, which mentions "building a wall of separation between church and State [sic]." From
this, the Court concluded that the scope of the Free Exercise Clause is limited. But see Wallace v. Jaffee, 472 U.S. 38 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that Jefferson's views on
the "wall of separation" should not be constitutionalized in Establishment Clause cases).
28. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 164.
29. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1878); see also Employment Div. v.
Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
30. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 165.
31. Smith, 494 U.S. at 879 (quoting from Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 166-67) states:
Laws are made for the government of actions, and while they cannot interfere
with mere religious belief and opinions, they may with practices . . . .Can a
man excuse his practices to the contrary because of his religious belief? To permit this would be to make the professed doctrines of religious belief superior to
the law of the land, and in effect to permit every citizen to become a law unto
himself.
32. Smith, 494 U.S. at 879-82 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
33. See. e.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1943): West Virginia Bd. of Educ.
v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943); Jones v.
Opelika, 316 U.S. 584 (1942); Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940);
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940),
34. 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
35. Id. at 303.
36. See supra notes 24-30 and accompanying text.
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causes without a certificate issued by the secretary of public welfare. The discretionary function3 8 of the secretary took the statute
out of the realm of general and nondiscriminatory legislation by allowing the secretary to deny the certificate "if he determines that the
cause is not a religious one. Such a censorship of religion as the
means of determining its right to survive is a denial of liberty protected by the First Amendment . . . ."' As in many free exercise
cases, 40 Cantwell involved both free exercise rights and free speech
rights.
The outcome of cases in the post-Cantwell era hinged on
whether or not a particular religious activity was constitutionally
protected by rights other than those found in the Free Exercise
Clause. The question of whether a school district could constitutionally expel students for refusing, on religious grounds, to salute the
flag, was first presented in Minersville School District v. Gobitis.4 1
First, the Court held the law requiring students to salute the flag
was constitutional"2 because of the strong state interest in promoting
national unity."a This portion of the Gobitis decision rested on the
assumption "that the power exists in the State to impose the flag
salute discipline upon school children in general.""' Second, the
Gobitis Court declined to grant an exception to those who refused to
salute the flag on religious grounds by stating: "The religious liberty
which the Constitution protects has never excluded legislation of
general scope not directed against doctrinal loyalties of particular
sects." 45 The first part of the Gobitis decision was short-lived.
Just three years later, West Virginia Board of Education v.
Barnette"' overruled Gobitis. In Barnette, the Court refused to ac37. Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 302.
38. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 879 (1990); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398,
400-01 (1963).
39. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 305 (1940). If the secretary had had no
discretion in issuing certificates, it appears that the statute would have been constitutional.
"[A] state may by general and nondiscriminatory legislation regulate the times, the places,
and the manner of soliciting upon its streets, . . . and may in other respects safeguard the
peace, good order, and comfort of the community, without unconstitutionally invading the liberties protected by the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 304.
40. See supra note 33.
41. 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
42. Id. at 600.
43. Id. at 595.
44. Id. at 593.
45. Id. at 594.
46. 319 U.S. 624 (1943). Justices Black, Douglas, and Murphy changed their votes.
Justices Jackson and Rutledge were new members of the Court replacing McReynolds and
Hughes, respectively. Justices Roberts, Reed, and Frankfurter stood by their decisions in Gobitis.
Justice Stone, the lone dissenter in Gobitis, joined the majority opinion in Barnette.
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cept the underlying assumption, previously applied in Gobitis, that
the state had the power to force school children to salute the flag.
The Court held that forcing students to salute the flag violated free
speech rights. 7 Thus, Barnette never addressed the second issue in
Gobitis of whether the Constitution compels exemption from generally applicable laws that conflict with an individual's religious
beliefs. 8
This undecided issue impacts greatly upon several areas, including taxation of religious activities and parental rights. The taxation
of religiously motivated conduct was the issue in Jones v. Opelika. 9
In Jones, the Court ruled that ordinances taxing peddlers5" and the
sale of books were constitutional notwithstanding arguments
presented by the Jehovah's Witnesses defendants. Just two years
later, the Jones decision was overruled by Murdock v. Pennsylvania. 1 In Murdock, the Court stated: "The constitutional rights of
those spreading their religious beliefs through the spoken and printed
word are not to be gauged by the standards governing retailers or
wholesalers of books."" The Court held it was immaterial whether
or not the tax was non-discriminatory 53 because a charge could not
be placed on a right guaranteed by the Constitution. 4 In reaching
its decision, the Court in Murdock again linked free exercise right
with other fundamental rights. The decision rested on free speech
and freedom of the press, in addition to free exercise grounds."
Parental rights were unsuccessfully asserted on free exercise
grounds in Prince v. Massachusetts.56 The Court upheld the conviction of a Jehovah's Witness church member who was charged with
supplying a child with literature for distribution in violation of child
labor laws. 57 The Court rejected the appellant's arguments that the
statute violated her right to the free exercise of religion and her parental rights derived from the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
47. Id. at 642.
48. Id. at 635 n.16 (quoting Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 593
(1940)).
49. 316 U.S. 584 (1942) (5-4 decision).
50. Companion cases Bowden v. Fort Smith (tax on peddlers) and Jobin v. Arizona (tax
on transient merchants, peddlers, and street vendors).
51. 319 U.S. 105 (1943) (5-4 decision). Justice Rutledge voted with the majority in
Murdock. He joined the Court when Justice Byrnes departed. Justice Byrnes voted with the
majority in Opelika.
52. Id. at 111.
53. Id. at 115.
54. Id. at 113.
55. See id. at 108.
56. 321 U.S. 158 (1943).
57. Id.

FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION

Amendment. 68 The State's interest in protecting children was found
to outweigh both free exercise59 and parental rights,
Prince was the last in the series of cases in the 1940s that coupled free exercise rights with other fundamental rights. These cases
of the early 1940s showed some increased awareness of the Free Exercise Clause. However, because another fundamental right was involved in each case, the independent strength of the free exercise
clause could not be assessed.
Between the 1940s and 1962, only one free exercise case of note
reached the Supreme Court. In Braunfeld v. Brown,6 1 the Court upheld a Pennsylvania Sunday closing law. The plurality opinion held
that the statute did not interfere with the free exercise of religion. 62
The Court noted that appellants were "not forced with as serious a
choice as forsaking their religious practices or subjecting themselves
to criminal prosecution." 3 One year later, the Supreme Court began
using the strict scrutiny test to evaluate free exercise claims.
D. Compelling Interest Era 1963-1990
The 1963 decision of Sherbert v. Verner" raised the level of
scrutiny to be applied to free exercise rights. Free exercise claims no
longer had to be linked with other fundamental rights to merit protection. The Court decided that a South Carolina textile worker, who
was fired from her job for refusing to work Saturdays because of her
religious beliefs, was entitled to unemployment compensation benefits. 65 The appellee, Employment Security Commission, found that
the worker had refused employment "without good cause" by declining to work on Saturdays.6 6 The "good cause" provision of the statute 67 allowed the Commission to decide whether compensation
58. See id. at 164; see also Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (holding
that parental rights were within the concept of liberty found in the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment).
59. Prince, 321 U.S. at 167.
60. See id. at 170.
61. 366 U.S. 599 (1961). Appellants were Orthodox Jews who owned retail stores in
Philadelphia. Id. at 601. Their religious views compelled them to close their stores from Friday
at nightfall until Saturday at nightfall. Id. The Sunday closing law, designed to give workers a
day off from work to observe religious services, forced appellants to choose between their religious beliefs and the economic hardships of closing their stores on two consecutive days. Id. at
601-02.
62. Id. at 609.
63. Id. at 605.
64. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
65. Id. at 410.
66. Id. at 401.
67. South Carolina Unemployment Compensation Act. §§ 68-1 to 68-404. Pertinent sections of the Act are quoted in Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 400 n.3.
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should be denied on a case-by-case basis. The Supreme Court began
its analysis by pointing out that the worker's "conscientious objection to Saturday work constitutes no conduct prohibited by religious
principles of a kind within the reach of state legislation."6' 8 Justice

Brennan, writing for the majority, then set forth a strict scrutiny test
for determining when a statute violates the Free Exercise Clause.
The Sherbert test has three requirements. First, the court must

determine whether a law imposes a burden on free exercise.6" Second, if a burden is found, the court must determine whether the government has a compelling interest that justifies the burden. Finally,

even if the government's interest is found to be compelling, the state
bears the burden of persuasion to prove that its compelling interest
could not be achieved through some less restrictive means.7 0
Wisconsin v. Yoder 7 is perhaps the most notable application7 2
of the Sherbert test. Members of two Amish orders were granted an
exception from a compulsory school attendance law that required
73
parents to send their children to school until the age of sixteen.
Defendants had been convicted of violating the law and were fined
five dollars each even though the statute called for imprisonment of
up to three months. 74 The Supreme Court carefully limited the scope

of its opinion to the narrow and unique situation presented by the
Amish. 75 The Court held that the State was prohibited from forcing
the Amish children to attend school until the age of sixteen by the

First and Fourteenth Amendments.76 The state failed "to show how
its admittedly strong interest in compulsory education would be adversely affected by granting an exemption to the Amish."7 7 The
68. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403.
69. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403-06 (1963).
70. Id. at 406-09.
71. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
72. "As of May 30, 1990, Sherbert had been cited in 546 recorded federal court cases
and 393 state court cases-a total of 939 applications over 27 years." Mitchell A. Tyner, Is
Religious Liberty A "Luxury" We Can No Longer Afford?, 85 LIBERTY, Sept.-Oct. 1990, at 2,
4.
73. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 207.
74. Id. at 208.
75. The Court observed:
Aided by a history of three centuries as an identifiable :teligious sect and a
long history as a successful and self-sufficient segment of American society, the
Amish in this case have convincingly demonstrated the sincerity of their beliefs,
the interrelationship of belief with their mode of life, the vital role that belief
and daily conduct play in the continued survival of Old Order Amish communities and their religious organization, and the hazards presented by the State's
enforcement of a statute generally valid as to others.
Id. at 235.
76. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234 (1972).
77. Id. at 236.

FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION

Yoder decision gave the Free Exercise Clause an "elevated status""8
among First Amendment rights.
Not all applications of the Sherbert test have resulted in exemp-

tions for religious actions. The Sherbert test was applied in United
States v. Lee 79 where Lee, an Amish carpenter and employer of sev-

eral Amish workers, claimed he should be exempt from Social Security tax laws that violated his religious beliefs. The Court agreed
that the Social Security system placed a burden on the free exercise
of Lee's religion.8 0 However, the government's "very high" interest

in enforcing mandatory compliance with Social Security laws outweighed this burden.81 The Court"' held that no exception was warranted because a strong government interest was involved and accommodating such exemptions would be difficult for the
government.8"
In recent years, the Supreme Court has been reluctant to apply
the strict scrutiny test 4 of Sherbert except in employment compensation cases.85 In Bowen v. Roy,8 6 Steven Roy's daughter was denied
benefits under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children and
Food Stamp programs because of his religious beliefs. Roy, a Native

American, believed the government's use of a Social Security number would "rob the spirit" of his young daughter. 87 The benefits were
denied to Roy's daughter because participants in the program had to
provide Social Security numbers before becoming eligible to receive
8a
the benefits.
The Supreme Court viewed Bowen as presenting two distinct
issues. The first issue was whether an individual's religious beliefs
78. Leo Pfeffer, The Supremacy of Free Exercise, 61 GEO. L.J. 1115, 1115 (1973).
79. 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
80. See id. at 257.
81. Id. at 258-59.
82. Id. at 252, 263. There were no dissenting votes from Justice Burger's majority opinion although Justice Stevens concurred in judgment only.
83. Id. at 259-60. The Court distinguished Yoder by inferring that the situation in
Yoder was much easier to accommodate. But see United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3
(1983), which stated: "The Court's attempt to distinguish Yoder is unconvincing because precisely the same religious interest is implicated in both cases and Wisconsin's interest in requiring its children to attend school until they reach age 16 is surely not inferior to the federal
interest in collecting these social security taxes." Id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
84. See infra notes 86-100 and accompanying text.
85. See Thomas v. Review Bd., Ind. Employment Security Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981)
(Jehovah's Witness entitled to receive unemployment compensation after being fired for refusing to work in section of plant that manufactured tank turrets) and Hobbie v. Unemployment
Appeals Comm'n of Fla., 480 U.S. 136 (1987) (reaffirming that unemployment compensation
benefits cannot be denied when employee is fired for refusing to work on their Sabbath).
86. 476 U.S. 693 (1986).
87. Id. at 700.
88. Id. at 695.
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could dictate internal government procedures. Eight Justices determined that the government's internal procedures should prevail. 89
Thus, the government was permitted to use Social Security numbers
to administer the benefits program without offending the Free Exercise Clause. 90
The second issue presented in Bowen was whether the government could require an applicant to provide a Social Security number
in order to qualify for the benefits programs. On this issue, the Justices were split into five camps. A three Justice plurality 1 refused to
apply the Sherbert test in this situation, which they described as a
mere denial of a government benefit by a uniformly applicable statute. 92 Justice Stevens felt the second issue was moot. 93 Justice Blackmun felt the record was not complete enough to decide the second
issue.9 4" Justices O'Connor, Brennan, and Marshall applied the Sherbert test and found the government failed to use the least restrictive
means to accomplish its goal. 95 Justice White dissented to Parts I
and II of Justice Burger's opinion, stating that Sherbert controlled
both issues.9"
In Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n 9 7 the
Court applied the reasoning from Part II of Bowen9 8 to allow the
United States Forest Service to construct a paved road through government lands despite the fact that such a road "will have severe
adverse effects on the practice of religion." 99 The majority opinion,
written by Justice O'Connor, rejected attempts to distinguish the
building of roads through sacred lands in Lyng from the government's use of a Social Security number in Bowen. 10 0 The Court
found that the government actions did not burden the Indians' free
exercise rights because the government's internal procedures cannot
89. Id. at 701.
90. Id. at 711.
91. Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986) (Burger, C.J., joined by Powell and Rehnquist,
J.J.).
92. Id. at 703.
93. Id. at 716-23.
94. Id. at 713.
95. Id. at 732.
96. Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 733 (1986).
97. 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
98. See supra notes 86-95 and accompanying text.
99. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 447.
100. Id. at 449. "In neither case . . . would the affected individuals be coerced by the
Government's action into violating their religious beliefs; nor would either governmental action
penalize religious activity by denying any person an equal share of the rights, benefits, and
privileges enjoyed by other citizens." Id.

FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION

be dictated by individuals' religious beliefs.10 1 Since the Court found
no burden,1"2 it was not necessary to look for a compelling state interest. The Bowen and Lyng decisions evidence the trend of not applying the compelling interest test of Sherbert to all free exercise
claims. This trend continued with the watershed case of Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v.
Smith. 103
III. The New Free Exercise Translation
A.

Background of the Smith II Decision

On April 17, 1990, the Court announced its decision in Smith
° The Court held that the Free Exercise Clause does not manI. 104

date granting an exception for religiously inspired conduct that a
state seeks to ban through criminal laws.10 5 The Court in Smith H
also held that the compelling interest test was inapplicable to acrossthe-board criminal statutes.10 6 Thus, the government no longer has
to justify unintended intrusions on individuals' religious activities
with a compelling state interest achieved through the least restrictive

means.'

07

The reaction to the Smith II decision was strong and immedi-

ate. 1 8 Justice O'Connor, concurring in the decision,

stated:

"[T]oday's holding dramatically departs from well-settled First
Amendment jurisprudence . . . and is incompatible with our Na-

tion's fundamental commitment to individual religious liberty."' 0 9
Roland R. Hegstad, editor of Liberty magazine, published by the
Seventh-Day Adventist Church, said the case "ranks right up with
the most devastating Supreme Court decisions of this century." 110
101. Id. at 452.
102. See generally Ira C. Lupu, Where Rights Begin: The Problems of Burdens on the
Free Exercise of Religion, 102 HARV. L. REV. 933 (1989) (an in-depth analysis of burdens on
free exercise and arguing for use of a subjective burden).
103. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
104. Id.
105. Id. at 890. Whether a statute is considered civil or criminal depends on the mode of
enforcement. See Salvation Army v. New Jersey Dep't of Community Affairs, 919 F.2d 183,
195 (3d Cir. 1990). For example, the criminal offense in Yoder was failure to send a sixteen
year old youth to school. See supra notes 71-78 and accompanying text. The criminal offense
in Hershberger was the use of lanterns and silver reflective tape rather than the use of mandated orange safety triangles to warn of a slow-moving vehicle. See infra notes 244-60 and
accompanying text.
106. Smith, 494 U.S. at 885.
107. Id.
108. See supra note 4 and infra notes 187, 192-94 and accompanying text.
109. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 891 (1990).
110. Roland R. Hegstad, 7.9 on the Richter Scale, 85 LiBERTY, Sept.-Oct. 1990, at 31.
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The controversy at issue in Smith H began in. 1984 when Alfred
L. Smith, a sixty-three year-old Klamath Indian, was fired from his
job as a drug counselor after he admitted ingesting a small amount
of peyote11 1 as part of a religious ceremony of the Native American
Church.1" His employer' 13 had a clear policy that prohibited its
counselors from using alcohol and nonprescription drugs." 4 The firing itself was never at issue. The question was whether Smith's application for unemployment compensation could be denied without
offending the United States Constitution.'" After several administrative hearings and appeals," 6 Smith's application was denied because the Employment Division characterized his use of peyote as
"misconduct."'" Under Oregon law, unemployment compensation is

properly denied when an employee is fired for "misconduct."

18

Co-

worker Galen Black's situation closely paralleled Smith's experience." 9 The Smith and Black cases went through the Oregon court
system separately before being consolidated by the United States Su-

preme Court.

20

The court explained:
The plant Lophophora williamsii, a small spineless cactus, found in the Rio
Grande Valley of Texas and northern Mexico, produces peyote, which grows in
small buttons on the top of the cactus. Peyote's principal constituent is mescaline. When taken internally by chewing the buttons or drinking a derivative tea,
peyote produces several types of hallucinations, depending primarily upon the
user. In most subjects is causes extraordinary vision marked by bright and kaleidoscopic colors, geometric patterns, or scenes involving humans or animals. In
others, it engenders hallucinatory symptoms similar to those produced in cases'of
schizophrenia, dementia praecox, or paranoia. Beyond its hallucinatory effect,
peyote renders for most users a heightened sense of comprehension; it fosters a
feeling of friendliness toward other persons.
People v. Woody, 394 P.2d 813, 816-17 (Cal. 1964).
112. Smith v. Employment Div., 721 P.2d 445, 452 (Or. 1986).
113. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 485 U.S. 660,
662 (1988) [hereinafter Employment Div. v. Smith, 485 U.S. 660 (1988)]. The employer was
the Douglas County Council on Alcohol and Drug Abuse Prevention and Treatment
(ADAPT), a non-profit corporation.
114. Id. at 662-63.
115. Id. at 663.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 664.
118. The Court noted:
Oregon Rev. Stat. § 657.176(2)(a) (1987) provides that "[aln individual shall
be disqualified from the receipt of benefits . . .if . . .the individual [hlas been
discharged for misconduct connected with work." Oregon Admin. Rule 471-30038(3) (1987) provides: "Under the provisions of ORS 657.176(2)(a) and (b),
misconduct is a wilful violation of the standards of behavior which an employer
has the right to expect of an employee. An act that amounts to a wilful disregard of an employer's interest, or recurring negligence which demonstrates
wrongful intent is misconduct."
Employment Div. v. Smith, 485 U.S. 660, 664 n.6 (1988).
119. Black v. Employment Div., 707 P.2d 1274 (Or. Ct. Ap]. 1985).
120. Smith, 485 U.S. at 663 n.4.
111.
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Smith and Black both appealed the denial of unemployment
compensation.' The Oregon Court of Appeals held that Black was
entitled to unemployment compensation. 2 The court applied the

Sherbert test and found that the state's interest in the financial integrity of the unemployment compensation fund was not compelling

enough to outweigh Black's right to free exercise of religion. 23 The
court of appeals also reversed the Employment Division's denial of
unemployment compensation for Smith 124 in light of its decision in
Black v. Employment Division.2 5

The Oregon Supreme Court126 affirmed both decisions. 2

In

Smith, 2 8 the Oregon Supreme Court began its analysis by rejecting

Smith's argument that denial of unemployment compensation violated the Oregon Constitution. 2 9 However, the court found that denying the benefits would violate the United States Constitution. 30
The court reached this conclusion by applying the Sherbert test'3 1
and decided that the state interest was the financial status of the
unemployment compensation fund, not proscribing the use of dangerous drugs. 13 Because the state interest in the fund was not considered compelling, the Sherbert test was not met, and the state
could not deny the unemployment compensation.' 33
In the companion case of Black v. Employment Division,"4 the

court noted its decision in Smith" 5 and then quoted extensively from
121. Smith v. Employment Div., 709 P.2d 246 (Or. Ct. App. 1985); Black, 707 P.2d
1274.
122. Black, 707 P.2d 1274.
123. Id. at 1278-80.
124. Smith, 709 P.2d 246.
125. Black v. Employment Div., 707 P.2d 1274 (Or. Ct. App. 1985).
126. Smith v. Employment Div., 709 P.2d 246 (Or. Ct. App. 1985); Black, 707 P.2d
1274.
127. Smith v. Employment Div., 721 P.2d 445 (Or. 1986); Black v. Employment Div.,
721 P.2d 451 (Or. 1986).
128. Smith, 721 P.2d 445.
129. The Oregon Supreme Court held that as long as the statute was neutral in application, the employees' motivation for their misconduct was irrelevant to the court's decision. The
court stated:
As long as disqualification by reason of the religiously based conduct is peculiar
to the particular employment and most other jobs remain open to the worker, we
do not believe that the state is denying the worker a vital necessity in applying
the "misconduct" exception of the unemployment compensation law.
Id. at 449.
130. Id. at 451.
131. Id. at 449-51.
132. Smith v. Employment Div., 721 P.2d 445, 450-51 (Or. 1986).
133. Id. at 451.
134. Black v. Employment Div., 721 P.2d 451 (Or. 1986).
135. Smith, 721 P.2d 445.
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the California case of People v. Woody. 36 The quote explained the
importance of peyote as a sacrament in the religious ceremonies of
the Native American Church."3 7 The court utilized the quote "for
illustration only," ' representing an effort by the court to avoid remanding the case for further findings. Accordingly, the court did not
remand the case back to the agency "because there is no genuine
dispute that the ingestion of peyote is a sacrament of the Native

American Church, that the claimant was a member of that Church,
and that his religious beliefs were sincerely held."'13

Use of the

quote from Woody was later cited by the Supreme Court as confusing the issue of whether or not religious use of peyote was legal in
Oregon. 4 0

Following the Oregon Supreme Court decisions, the United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari'" for the first"" of two appearances before the Court. The Black' 43 and Smith 44 decisions
were consolidated in Employment Division v. Smith'" (hereinafter
referred to in the text as Smith I). The issue in Smith I was whether
the illegality of the conduct for which respondents were fired was
relevant to the constitutional analysis. 46 The Court pointed out that

the conduct at issue in the unemployment cases of Sherbert,147
Thomas, 4 8 and Hobbie'" was perfectly legal. 50 The Court was uncertain whether or not the religious use of peyote was legal in Oregon.' 5 ' Because this distinction was critical to the Court's analysis, it
136. People v. Woody, 394 P.2d 813 (Cal. 1964) (holding that religious use of peyote
was legal in California).
137. Black, 721 P.2d at 453-54.
138. Id. at 454.
139. Black v. Employment Div., 721 P.2d 451, 454 (Or. 1986).
140. Employment Div. v. Smith, 485 U.S. 660, 668 (1988); see infra notes 151-53 and
accompanying text.
141. Employment Div. v. Smith, 480 U.S. 916 (1987).
142. Employment Div. v. Smith, 485 U.S. 660 (1988). The Smith and Black cases were
consolidated at this point. Id. at 664 n.4.
143. Black, 721 P.2d 451.
144. Smith v. Employment Div., 721 P.2d 445 (Or. 1986).
145. Smith, 485 U.S. 660 (Opinion by Stevens, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., White,
O'Connor, and Scalia, JJ. Dissent by Brennan, J., joined by Marshall and Blackmun, JJ. Kennedy, J. took no part).
146. Id. at 662.
147. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); see supra notes 64-70.
148. Thomas v. Review Bd., Ind. Employment Security Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981); see
supra note 85.
149. Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n of Fla., 480 U.S. 142 (1987); see supra
note 85.
150. Employment Div. v. Smith, 485 U.S. 660, 671 (1988).
151. Id. at 668. The Court was unsure if the religious use of peyote was legal in Oregon
because the Oregon Supreme Court had quoted extensively from a case which held that the
religious use of peyote was legal in California. Black v. Employment Div., 721 P.2d 451, 453-
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remanded for clarification on this issue.1 5 The Court stated:
[I]f Oregon does prohibit the religious use of peyote, and if that
prohibition is consistent with the Federal Constitution, there is
no federal right to engage in that conduct in Oregon. If that is
the case, the State is free to withhold unemployment compensation from respondents for engaging in work-related misconduct,
despite its religious motivation. Thus, paradoxical as it may first
appear, a necessary predicate to a correct evaluation of respondents' federal claim is an understanding of the legality of their
conduct as a matter of state law.'" 3
On remand, the Oregon Supreme Court concluded that Oregon
law did not provide an exemption for religious use of peyote."" However, "outright prohibition of good faith religious use of peyote. . .
would violate the First Amendment directly and as interpreted by
Congress."' 55 The Oregon court looked to the legislative history of
the Drug Abuse Control Amendments of 19651 and to the American Indian Religious Freedoms Act 57 to explain how Congress applied the First Amendment protections to religious use of peyote by
Native Americans. Thus, the court reaffirmed its earlier conclusion 1 8 that respondents could not be denied unemployment
compensation.
B.

The Smith II Decision

The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari for a second time. 159 Justice Scalia16 described the first issue as "whether
the Free Exercise Clause . . . permits the State of Oregon to include
religiously inspired peyote use within the reach of its general crimi6 The Court began its discusnal prohibition on use of that drug."' '1
54 (Or. 1986); see supra notes 134-40 and accompanying text.
152. Smith, 485 U.S. at 668.
153. Id. at 672.
154. Smith v. Employment Div., 763 P.2d 146, 148 (Or. 1988).
155. Id. at 148.
156. "Congress made clear that it expected the implementing regulations to exempt the
religious use of peyote." Id. at 149.
157. Id.
158. Smith v. Employment Div., 721 P.2d 445 (Or. 1986); Black v. Employment Div.,
721 P.2d 451 (Or. 1986).
159. Employment Div. v. Smith, 489 U.S. 1077 (1989).
160. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 874 (1990). Justice Scalia wrote the
opinion of the Court, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, Stevens, and
Kennedy.
161. Id.; see generally William P. Marshall, The Case Against the Constitutionally
Compelled Free Exercise Exemption, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV, 357 (1989-90); Geoffrey R.
Stone, Constitutionally Compelled Exemptions and the Free Exercise Clause, 27 WM. &
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sion with a brief procedural history, 16 2 mentioning the critical distinction drawn in Smith P63 between the legal conduct in Sherbert

and its progeny and the criminal nature of peyote use."" The Court
reiterated the long held view that the government could not interfere
with religious beliefs as such and could not "ban . . . acts or abstentions only when they are engaged in for religious reasons."' 69 Respondents were accused of trying to take the meaning of "prohibiting

the free exercise [of religion] one large step further." 1 ' In the majority's view, the First Amendment is not violated by the incidental
effect of a generally applicable law.'" 7 Justice O'Connor, concurring
in the decision, reminded the Court that "[t]he First Amendment
does not distinguish between laws that are generally applicable and
laws that target particular religious practices."' 68
The Court relied on precedent to support its holding that religious convictions do not excuse an individual from laws of general
70 Gobitis,'71
applicability. 6 To illustrate this point, the Court cited
a case that was overturned on other grounds three years after it was
decided.1 72 The Court also noted the Reynolds'" decision for the
proposition that if each individual could ignore laws that violated his
beliefs, this would "permit every citizen to become a law unto
1

himself."'

74

L. REV. 985 (1985-86); Ellis West, The Case Against a Right to Religion-Based Exemptions, 4 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 591 (1990).
162. Smith, 494 U.S. at 874-75.
163. Employment Div. v. Smith, 485 U.S. 660 (1988).
164. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 875-76 (1990).
165. Id. at 877. The Supreme Court has an opportunity to rule on this issue in the
October 1992 term. The Court granted certiorari in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City
of Hialeah, 723 F. Supp. 1467 (S.D. Fla. 1989), af'd, 936 F.2d 586 (11 th Cir. 1991) (memorandum decision), cert. granted, 112 S. Ct. 1472 (1992). The District Court held there was no
free exercise violation by municipal ordinances which prohibited ritual animal sacrifice except
where zoning allowed slaughterhouses. The court found that the city':s interest in safeguarding
public health, preventing cruelty to animals, and protecting the psychological well-being of
children outweighed the incidental burden placed on the santeria religion.
166. Id. at 878.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 894. O'Connor, J. was joined in Parts I and II of her opinion by Brennan,
Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ.
169. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878-81 (1990).
170. Id. at 878.
171. Minersville School Dist. Bd. of Educ, v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1949); see supra
notes 41-48 and accompanying text.
172. West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 158 (1943); see supra notes 4648 and accompanying text.
173. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879); see supra notes 24-32 and accompanying text.
174. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990) (quoting United States v.
Reynolds, 98 U.S. 145, 166-67 (1878)).
MARY
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Similarly, the Court cited United States v. Lee175 as a modern
example in which the Court rejected a claim for an exemption to a
law of general applicability.171 In Lee, the Court recognized the
strong state interest in collecting Social Security taxes and expressed
its reluctance to allow taxpayers to object whenever tax monies were
spent in a way that violated their religious beliefs. 17" Because of the
Court's reluctance to obstruct a state's ability to collect taxes, Lee
lends scant support to the Court's broad holding in Smith I that
generally applicable laws are always enforceable even when they
burden the free exercise of religion.
One of the most controversial aspects of the Smith H decision is
7 9
78
how the Court distinguished cases such as Cantwell,1 Murdock,'
Barnette,'8" and Yoder.' 8' The Court described these decisions as
"hybrid"1" 2 because they involved free speech and/or parental rights
in addition to free exercise claims.1 "' By requiring free exercise to be
coupled with another fundamental right before it is entitled to a
compelling interest test, the constitutional significance of the Free
Exercise Clause is greatly reduced.
The Court also held that the Sherbert test should not be applied
in the Smith H case. 84 The Court limited Sherbert and its progeny
to the unemployment compensation field because the unemployment
compensation statutes have "mechanism[s] for individualized exemptions."'18 Because the Sherbert test had always been satisfied in
Supreme Court cases falling outside the unemployment compensation area, the Court felt justified in denying its application in this
case. 18 6 Justice O'Connor responded: "It is surely unusual to judge
the vitality of a constitutional doctrine by looking to the win-loss
'
record of the plaintiffs who happen to come before us. "187
The majority insisted that requiring the government to show a
compelling interest before it can enforce a generally applicable law
every time a law burdens an individual's religious beliefs "would pro175.
ing text.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.

United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982); see supra notes 79-83 and accompanySmith, 494 U.S. at 880.
Lee, 455 U.S. at 260.
See supra notes 34-39 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 51-55 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 71-78 and accompanying text.
Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 882 (1990).
Id.
Id. at 885.
Id. at 884 (quoting Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 708 (1986)).
Id. at 888-89.
Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 897 (1990).
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duce . . . a constitutional anomaly."' 88 According to the Court, a
society that applied the compelling interest test to every situation in
which religious motivation is claimed would be "courting anarchy."' 8 9 The Court stated: "[W]e cannot afford the luxury of deeming presumptively invalid, as applied to the religious objector, every
regulation of conduct that does not protect an interest of the highest
order."' 90 The Court listed military service, payment of taxes, child
neglect laws, drug laws, traffic laws, minimum wage laws, child labor, animal cruelty laws, environmental protection, and equal opportunity as areas that would be adversely affected by applying the
compelling interest test. 9 ' Justice O'Connor calls this list a "parade
of horribles"' 92 that indicates how the compelling interest test was
used to strike a workable balance between religious liberty and legitimate government interests. 9 3 According to critics, removing the
government's burden of proving a compelling state interest in free
exercise cases is one of the most damaging results of the Smith II
decision.""
The Court summarized its opinion by stating that it would leave
the accommodation of religious beliefs to the political process. 195 If
any exceptions should be granted at all, the Court contended, the
exceptions must be granted by the majority in a democratic system
such as ours.' 96 Justice O'Connor reminded the Court that the reason the First Amendment was enacted was "to protect the rights of
those whose religious practices are not shared by the majority and
may be viewed with hostility."' 9 7 Justice O'Connor quoted Justice
Jackson:
The very purpose of a bill of rights was to withdraw certain
subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place
them beyond the reach of the majorities and officials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts.
One's right to life, liberty, a free press, freedom of worship and
assembly, and other fundamental rights may not be submitted to
188. Id. at 886.
189. Id. at 888.
190. Id. (emphasis in original).
191. Id. at 888-89.
192. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 902 (1990).
193. Id.
194. William Bentley Ball, High Court Goes Cold on Religious Liberty, L.A. TIMES,
Apr. 22, 1990, at M3.
195. Smith, 494 U.S. at 890.
196. Id.
197. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 902 (1990).
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vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections.198

Justice Jackson's words stand in sharp contrast to Justice Scalia's
assertion that placing religious minorities at "a relative disadvantage
'
• . . [is an] unavoidable consequence of democratic government." 199

IV.

The Status Quo: Free Exercise After Smith II
0 decision has drastically changed
The Smith IPO
the way courts

evaluate free exercise challenges."0 1 The Court in Smith I held that
the Free Exercise Clause does not protect religiously inspired conduct that is banned by criminal laws.20 The law is valid "if prohibiting the exercise of religion is not the object of the . . . [law] but
merely an incidental effect of a generally applicable and otherwise
valid provision. '"203

The Court in Smith II also held that the compelling interest test
should not be applied to across-the-board criminal statutes. 0° The
government no longer has to justify incidental intrusions on individuals' religious activities by proving a compelling state interest
achieved through the least restrictive means. A survey of cases decided since the Smith H holding illustrates how free exercise jurisprudence has been altered, what areas remain relatively unaffected,
A.

05

and what to expect in the future.

The General Effects

The Smith II decision allows courts to easily dispose of drug
cases where free exercise rights are claimed. In Ohio, a defendant
198. Id. at 903 (quoting West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638
(1943)).
199. Id. at 890.
200. 494 U.S. 872.
201. See infra notes 206-60 and accompanying text.
202. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990). Whether a statute is considered civil or criminal depends on the mode of enforcement. Salvation Army v. New Jersey
Dep't of Community Affairs, 919 F.2d 183, 195 (3d Cir. 1990). For example, the criminal
offense in Yoder was failure to send a sixteen year old youth to school. See supra notes 71-78
and accompanying text. The criminal offense in Hershbergerwas the use of lanterns and silver
reflective tape rather than the use of the mandated orange safety triangles to warn of a slowmoving vehicle. See infra notes 249-60 and accompanying text.
203. Smith, 494 U.S. at 878.
204. Id. at 884.
205. The Smith I1 opinion did not alter every free exercise situation. For example, prisoners' rights are not affected by the Smith !1 decision. One judge commented: "Smith 11
does not alter the rights of prisoners, it simply brings the free exercise rights of private citizens
closer to those of prisoners." Salaam v. Lockhart, 905 F.2d 1168, 1171 n.7 (8th Cir. 1990); see
also Hunafa v. Murphy, 907 F.2d 46 (7th Cir. 1990) (noting that Smith II may give prison
officials a good defense from allegations that serving pork to Muslim prisoners violates the
inmates' free exercise rights).
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appealed his conviction for possession of marijuan1a by claiming his
free exercise rights were violated.20° The defendant claimed he
founded a religious group that believes in a supreme being and uses
marijuana as an important part of the religion.20 The judge stated:
[Flor better or for worse, the United States Supreme Court has
signaled a new parameter in the government's ability to curtail
religious practice without first demanding that the state set forth
and prove that it has a compelling interest which supersedes the
individual's right to exercise his religious freedom. The Smith
[II] case therefore reduces appellant's arguments to a puff of
smoke.2"'
In Smith II, the Supreme Court specifically stated that free exercise cases involving use of drugs should not have to be judged by a
compelling interest standard.2 0 9 In Part III of her concurrence, Justice O'Connor applied the strict scrutiny test, found a compelling
state interest in controlling drugs, and denied petitioner's unemployment compensation.2 10 According to Justice O'Connor, the majority
went far beyond what was necessary to decide the case"' when it
held that the strict scrutiny test did not have to be applied. The dissent suggested the Court's decision was "a product of overreaction to
the serious problems the country's drug crisis has generated."2 2
The Smith II holding reaches far beyond denying Native Americans an exemption for the religious use of peyote. More "mainstream" religions have also been affected. A Catholic organization
claimed that sections of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of
1986 restricted its free exercise of religion.21 The law did not allow
the organization to "offer employment to people in need, without regard to their immigration status, as part of their religious ministries."2 " Plaintiffs argued that the goals of the statute could be met
even if a narrow exception was made for employers who hired solely
206. Ohio v. Flesher, No. 89-P-2084, 1990 WL 73953 (Ohio Ct. App. Portage County,
June I, 1990).
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 889 (1990).
210. Id. at 903-07 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
211. Id. at 891, 903.
212. Id. at 908 (Blackmun, Brennan, and Marshall, JJ., dissenting). The dissent would
distinguish between use of peyote and other drugs. "Some religious claims . . . involve drugs
such as marijuana and heroin, in which there is significant illegal traffic, with its attendant
greed and violence, so that it would be difficult to grant a religious exemption without seriously
compromising law enforcement efforts." Id. at 918.
213. Intercommunity Center for Justice and Peace v. Immigration and Naturalization
Serv., 910 F.2d 42 (2d Cir. 1990).
214. Id. at 43.
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on religious grounds.2 15 The court responded that no free exercise
claim existed because the law was "a valid, neutral law of general
application that happens to compel action contrary to certain religious beliefs."2 1 The court used the reasoning of Smith II to quickly
dispose of this free exercise claim without applying a strict scrutiny
test.21
B.

"Hybrid" Situations

One type of free exercise claim which may still be entitled to
close judicial scrutiny is the "hybrid" situation where more than one
fundamental right is involved. 18 For instance, some cases involving
free exercise coupled with other rights continue to be evaluated
under the strict scrutiny test.219 These courts reason that Smith II
does not affect application of the strict scrutiny test in hybrid situations. 220 This view is not unanimous.
In Cornerstone Bible Church v. Hastings,22 1 a church claimed
that the city zoning ordinance violated the church's right to free
speech, freedom of association, due process, equal protection, and
free exercise.222 The ordinance prohibited churches from locating in
areas zoned for commercial or industrial uses. 22 1 The court disposed
224
of each alleged violation of constitutional rights individually.
When the court analyzed the free exercise claim, the Church
claimed a "hybrid" situation existed because its free speech and
other rights were infringed upon. 225 The court looked back to its earlier analysis of the other constitutional claims and stated: "Because
plaintiffs have failed to establish a violation of another free exercise
right, their free exercise claim alone is not sufficient to establish a
215. Id. at 44.
216. Id.
217. After disposing of the free exercise claim, the court stated that even without the
decision in Smith I1 it would only have applied a rational basis test. Id. at 45 (citing Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 884 (1990)).
218. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881-82 (1990).
219. See, e.g., Vermont v. DeLaBruere, 577 A.2d 254 (Vt. 1990) (compelling state interest in education overcomes parental objection to state reporting requirements for churchbased school); Zummo v. Zummo, 574 A.2d 1130 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) (father's free exercise
rights violated by a lower court order prohibiting him from taking his children to non-Jewish
religious services while he had weekend custody).
220. Society of Separationists, Inc. v. Herman, 939 F.2d 1207, 1216 (5th Cir. 1991). In
case where atheist refused to take oath or affirmation as ordered by district court judge,
"Smith [11] specifically excepts religion-plus-speech cases from its holding." Id.
221. Cornerstone Bible Church v. City of Hastings, 740 F. Supp. 654 (D. Minn. 1990).
222. Id. at 656.
223. Id.
224. See id. at 660-69.
225. Id. at 670.
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cause of action. '226 This interpretation goes beyond Smith IP2 7 by
requiring that other fundamental rights be violated before a free exercise claim is even considered. Such an interpretation ignores the
discussion in Smith II which stated that cases involving free speech
and/or other fundamental rights are "reinforced ' 218 by free exercise
claims.
The current status of whether a strict scrutiny test still applies
to these hybrid situations remains uncertain. Future litigation may
help determine whether these cases are beyond the reach of the
Smith II decision and to what extent a free exercise claim can "reinforce" other fundamental rights.
C.

The Civil-Criminal Distinction

Smith II involved a criminal statute. One question unanswered
by the Smith II case is whether the decision extends to civil laws as
well. After a detailed analysis, the Third Circuit held that Smith II
extends to neutral, generally applicable civil statutes as well. 229 On
the other hand, a Minnesota court, without analyzing the reasoning
behind Smith II, ruled that Smith II is inapplicable to civil laws; the
court simply noted that Smith II involved a criminal statute. 23 0 The
Third Circuit view appears to be the better reasoned of these two
interpretations. However, for those litigating free exercise claims, the
civil-criminal distinction may be a plausible argument as courts continue to interpret the contours of Smith II.
D. Laws Directed Toward Religious Acts
Two types of free exercise claims are still entitled to a strict
scrutiny test after Smith I. The first situation arises when a law is
directed only to religious acts.2 3 1 One such case occurred when a
226. Cornerstone Bible Church v. City of Hastings, 740 F. Supp. 654, 670 (D. Minn.
1990).
227. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881-82 (1990); see supra notes 168-90.
Smith II requires that a claim "involve" more than one fundamental right before the free
exercise claim is entitled to strict scrutiny.
228. Smith, 494 U.S. at 881-83; see also Salvation Army v. New Jersey Dep't of Community Affairs, 919 F.2d 183, 200 n.9 (3d Cir. 1990) (believing Ihe Court in Smith I1 "was
contemplating situations where state action is directly addressed to . . . [other fundamental
rights] for religious purposes").
229. Salvation Army, 919 F.2d 183; accord United States v. Philadelphia Soc'y of
Friends, 753 F. Supp. 1302 (E.D. Pa. 1990).
230. Hill-Murray Federation of Teachers v. Hill-Murray High School, 471 N.W.2d 372,
380 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991).
231. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877-78 (1990). The Court stated: "It
would be true, we think (though no case of ours has involved the point), that a state would be
'prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]' if it sought to ban such acts or abstentions only
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Philadelphia school teacher sued the school district for refusing to
allow her to wear traditional Muslim religious attire in the classroom.2321 The school district attempted to enforce a state statute that
23 3
prohibited teachers from wearing religious garb in the classroom.
The court stated:
While the Smith [II] decision may represent a considerable shift
in the Court's direction in free exercise jurisprudence, it does
not have any impact on our interpretation .

.

. By its terms,

the Smith [II] decision is restricted to situations where government action is not specifically addressed to religious practice. 34
A strict scrutiny test was applied because the state statute specifically regulated the wearing of religious garb.2" 5 The court ruled that
the state had a compelling interest in preserving an atmosphere of
religious neutrality in the schools.2 36 Thus, the free exercise claim
failed despite application of the strict scrutiny test.237
E.

Laws with Systems for Exceptions

The second type of free exercise claim that still receives strict
scrutiny analysis occurs when the challenged statute contains a system for exceptions.2 31 Laws with systems for exceptions are not
"generally applicable"2 3 9 and so are not encompassed by the Smith
II holding.24 0 State unemployment compensation acts are an example of such a statute2 41 because these acts typically allow for some
discretion when determining a claimant's eligibility. The strict scruwhen they are engaged in for religious reasons .
Id.
232. United States v. Board of Educ. for Phila. School Dist., 911 F.2d 882, 884-85 (3d
Cir. 1990).
233. Id. at 885.
234. Id. at 889. The Court may address this issue in a case which was scheduled for
argument as this Comment went to publication. See Church of Lukumi Bablu Aye v. City of
Hialcah, supra note 165.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 893.
237. United States v. Board of Educ. for Phila. School Dist., 911 F.2d 882, 894 (3d Cir.
1990); see also Savage v. Trammel Crow Co., Inc., 273 Cal. Rptr. 302 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990)
(shopping center policy prohibiting religious solicitation while allowing political solicitation
was directed at activity engaged in solely for religious reasons).
238. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 884-85 (1990).
239. Id. at 881.
240. Id. at 885. Although the facts involved denial of unemployment compensation, the
issue in Smith 11 was whether Oregon could apply its drug law to those who used peyote for
religious reasons without offending the Free Exercise Clause. Thus, the statute being challenged in Smith II was the generally applicable drug law, not the unemployment compensation
act.
241. Id. at 884; see also Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); supra notes 64-70
and accompanying text.
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tiny test should continue to be applied when courts are asked to
judge the constitutionality of statutes with built-in systems for
exceptions.2 42
F. Free Exercise Under State Constitutions-The Minnesota
Experience
The Smith 11 case addressed questions concerning the free exercise of religion under the United States Constitution. The decision
will have no direct effect on the way state courts analyze free exercise claims under state constitutions. Persons arguing free exercise
claims will increasingly depend on state courts and state constitutions to uphold the free exercise of religion.2 , 3 Minnesota is an example of a state whose constitution provides greater free exercise
rights than its federal counterpart.
In Minnesota v. Hershberger,14 the Minnesota Supreme Court
originally held that a statute, as it applied to the: Amish defendants,
violated the Free Exercise Clause of the United States Constitution.
The statute required all slow moving vehicles to display a florescent
orange triangle during times of low visibility.2 45 The defendants
challenged the statute because Amish beliefs forbid the use of bright
colors. 4 The court reached its decision by apiplying the Sherbert
test.24 7 It found a burden on religion and a compelling state interest
in highway safety, but ruled that the statute failed to provide the
least restrictive means.24 The court recognized that the state interest in highway safety could be met with alternatives such as silver
reflective signs and red lanterns that did not offend Amish beliefs.2 49
On April 23, 1990, just days after deciding Smith II, the Supreme
Court issued a memorandum decision vacating 5 0 the judgment in
25 1 The case was remanded for further consideration
Hershberger.
in
242. Cf. Vandiver v. Hardin County Bd. of Educ., 925 F.2d 931 (6th Cir. 1991) (A
Kentucky statute allowed school principal discretion to choose between two methods for deciding if transferring students should be given credit for previous studies. The court decided not
to apply a strict scrutiny test absent evidence of a discriminatory intent by the principal
against religion.).
243. See generally Debra L. Willen, Now States Act as Champions for Religion, 14
NAT'L L.J., Mar. 2, 1992, at 15.
244. 444 N.W.2d 282, 289 (Minn. 1989).
245. Id. at 284.
246. Id. at 284-85.
247. Id. at 285.
248. Id. at 286-89.
249. Minnesota v. Hershberger, 444 N.W.2d 282, 286-89 (Minn. 1989).
250. Minnesota v. Hershberger, 495 U.S. 901 (1990).
251. Hershberger, 444 N.W.2d 282.
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light of Smith H.52
On remand,25 a the Minnesota Supreme Court declined to apply
the Smith II holding to the facts. Rather, the court analyzed the
situation under the Minnesota Constitution.2 54 The court found the
language of the state constitution "of a distinctly stronger character
than the federal counterpart. 2 55 Both religious freedom and public
safety were held to be fundamental interests, and the court found
that the State had failed to prove its public safety interest was being
met by the least restrictive means. The court summed up the compromise: "The reflective tape and lighted lantern provides an alternative that achieves both of the important values . . . freedom of conscience and public safety." '56

In an effort to avoid wasting judicial effort on both the state and
federal level, the Minnesota courts are now analyzing state constitutional questions before turning to federal constitutional questions.2 5
By doing so, the remand situation found in the Hershbergercases2" 8

is avoided. Minnesota courts are now using the strict scrutiny test
described in the second Hershberger case,2 59 i.e., the Sherbert test,
to analyze free exercise claims under the Minnesota Constitution.2 60
252.

Hershberger, 495 U.S. 901.

253.

Minnesota v. Hershberger, 462 N.W.2d 393 (Minn. 1990).

254.

Article 1, section 16 of the Minnesota Constitution states:

The right of every man to worship God according to the dictates of his own
conscience shall never'be infringed . . . nor shall any control of or interference
with the rights of conscience be permitted . . .; but the liberty of conscience
hereby secured shall not be so construed as to excuse acts of licentiousness or
justify practices inconsistent with the peace or safety of the state.
Hershberger, 462 N.W.2d at 397.
255.

Id.

256.

Id. at 399.

257. Cooper v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2 (Minn. 1990). In Cooper, a landlord refused to
rent to an engaged but unmarried couple because he believed living together was "sinful." Id.
at 4. The court held that the landlord's refusal to rent was protected by the free exercise
portion of the state constitution and therefore did not violate the prohibition against marital
status discrimination found in the Minnesota Human Rights Act. Id. at 9-10. But cf. Bob
Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983) (racially discriminatory private religious
schools can be denied tax exempt status without violating the Free Exercise Clause of the
federal constitution).
258.

See supra notes 252-54 and accompanying text.

259.

462 N.W.2d 393 (Minn. 1990).

260. In re Welfare of T.K. and W.K., 475 N.W.2d 88 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991) (court
applied the strict scrutiny test from "'HershbergerIf' [462 N.W.2d 393 (Minn. 1990)], reversed and remanded a trial court decision to remove children from the family home when
parents refused, on religious grounds, to allow their home-schooled children to take standardized tests).
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G. Attempted Legislative Response to Smith II
The Religious Freedom Restoration Act26 1 was first introduced
in the House of Representatives during the summer of 1990. The
Bill was aimed directly at reversing the effects of the Smith H decision by legislating the compelling interest test back into free exercise
litigation. 26 2 The text of the Bill recited the Sherbert test virtually
verbatim and expressly provided that the test be applied to laws of
general applicability.26 a The Bill also contained an important provi2 64
sion allowing for the award of attorneys fees.
261.
SECTION 1.SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the "Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1990."
SECTION 2. THE FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION PROTECTED.
(a) In General.-Except as provided in subsection (b), a governmental authority may not restrict any person's free exercise of religion.
(b) Laws of General Applicability.-A governmental aulhority may restrict
any person's free exercise of religion only if(I) the restriction(A) is in the form of general applicability; and
(B) does not intentionally discriminate against religion, or
among religions; and
(2) the governmental authority demonstrates that application of the
restriction to the person(A) is essential to further a compelling governmental interest;
and
(B) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling
governmental interest.
SECTION 4. DEFINITIONS
As used in this Act(1) the term "governmental authority" means any authority of the
Federal Government or of the government of the State, and includes political subdivisions, agencies, and municipalities of a State;
(2) the term "State" includes the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and each other territory or possession of the
United States;
(3) the term "demonstrates" means meets the burdens of going forward with the evidence and of persuasion; and
(4) the term "person" includes both natural persons and religious
organizations, associations, or corporations.
SECTION 5. RULE OF CONSTRUCTION
(a) In General.-This Act applies(I) to every Federal or State law, regulation, administrative order,
decision, practice, or other action previously enacted, adopted, or implemented; and
(2) to every State law, regulation, administrative order, decision,
practice, or other action subsequently enacted, adopted, or implemented.
SECTION 6. ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE UNAFFECTED
Nothing in this Act limits or creates rights under that portion of the first
article of amendment to the Constitution that prohibits laws respecting an establishment of religion.
H.R. 5377, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., Cong. Rec. - (1990).
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Id. § 3.
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Although the Religious Freedom Restoration Act is endorsed by
a wide range of religious organizations, 28 5 it does not enjoy universal
support.116 The Bill's chances of becoming law have diminished significantly since it became entangled in the abortion controversy. 6
Pro-life forces are concerned that the Bill could be used to provide a
woman with the legal framework.to obtain an abortion on religious
grounds if Roe v. Wade26 is overturned. Although sponsors insist the
Bill is neutral on the abortion issue, a compromise has yet to be
reached.26 9
Congress apparently has the power to reverse the effects of
Smith II under section five of the Fourteenth Amendment.2 70 By attempting to legislate protection for a certain right, Congress is following an unusual, but not totally unprecedented strategy. A similar
approach was used in the early 1960s when Congress exerted its
power by legislating that literacy tests could not be used as a prerequisite for voter registration.2 71 The Voting Rights Act of 1965272 effectively reversed Lassiter v. Northhampton County Bd. of Elections,273 which upheld a North Carolina statute that required a
literacy test for voter registration. In South Carolina v. Katzenbach,27 4 the Court upheld the validity of the Voting Rights Act's
suspension of literacy tests, confirming that Congress had the power
to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment. The Civil Rights Act of 1991
is an example of a more recent attempt by Congress to overrule Su275
preme Court decisions.
265. "The new allies range from the conservative National Association of Evangelicals
to the liberal National Council of Churches, and include both conservative and liberal Baptist
and Jewish groups." Michael Hirsley, Churches Battle for Return to Past, CHICAGO TRIBUNE,
Aug. 9, 1991, at C9. The Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1992 was introduced by Senators Ted Kennedy (D-Mass.) and Orrin Hatch (R-Utah), 138 Cong. Rec. S9777-02, S9821.
266. Id. The United States Catholic Conference did not endorse or oppose the Act.
267. Robert P. Hey, Religious Freedom Legislation Could Snag on Abortion Controversy, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, July 1, 1991, at 8.
268. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
269. See supra note 267.
270. See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 n.10 (1966) ("We emphasize that
Congress' power under § 5 [of the Fourteenth Amendment] is limited to adopting measures to
enforce the guarantees of the Amendment; § 5 grants Congress no power to restrict, abrogate,
or dilute these guarantees.").
271. Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1992) (contains a provision suspending the use of literacy tests as a prerequisite to voter registration).
272. Id.
273. Lassiter v. Northhampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45 (1959).
274. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
275. Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1992).
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Conclusion

In the Smith H decision, the Supreme Court drastically altered
the way courts analyze claims involving the free exercise of religion
under the United States Constitution. Whether one agrees or disagrees with the decision, it sets the new standard against which free
exercise claims will be evaluated. A thorough understanding of the
Smith II decision is a prerequisite to comprehending the current status of the free exercise of religion.
Those interested in safeguarding the free exercise of religion
should promote legislative reform rather than rely on courts and the
Constitution to provide protection. Persons claiming that their free
exercise has been violated must carefully analyze Smith H and attempt to fashion their claim to avoid those situations curtailed by the
Smith II holding. Fifty state constitutions remain unaffected by
Smith II. Naturally, litigants are wise to look to state constitutions
as they seek to protect their free exercise of religion.
Philip Spare

